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ABSTRACT: This paper resolves a paradox concerning colour constancy. On the one hand, 
our intuitive, pre-theoretical concept holds that colour constancy involves invariance in the 
perceived colours of surfaces under changes in illumination. On the other, there is a robust 
scientific consensus that colour constancy can persist in cerebral achromatopsia, a profound 
impairment in the ability to perceive colours. The first stage of the solution advocates pluralism 
about our colour constancy capacities. The second details the close relationship between colour 
constancy and contrast. The third argues that achromatopsics retain a basic type of colour 
constancy associated with invariants in contrast processing. The fourth suggests that one 
person-level, conscious upshot of such processing is the visual awareness of chromatic 
contrasts ‘at’ the edges of surfaces, implicating the ‘colour for form’ perceptual function. This 
primitive type of constancy sheds new light on our most basic perceptual capacities, which 
mark the lower borders of representational mind. 
---- 
The notion of perceptual constancy is receiving renewed interest in the philosophy of 
perception. Historically, constancy has generated much puzzlement, in how best to account 
for the dual, competing invariance and variance that we encounter, for example, when 
looking at a white wall in yellow light, or a coin tilted at an angle. These remain live 
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concerns, but recently there has been a shift in focus, to theorising constancy as a basis for 
objective mental representation of our environments. On this theme, Burge (2014: 486) has 
argued that ‘the most primitive, distinctively psychological type of representation is 
perception. The lower border of perception is the lower border of representational mind.’ In 
turn, the borders of perception are marked by the presence of perceptual constancies. 
Constancies are capacities for ‘objectification,’ for ‘marking off states that are as of specific 
system-independent elements in the environment from states idiosyncratic or local to the 
perceiver,’ (2010: 400). This ‘notion of objectivity provides the most specific constraint on 
the type of sensory transactions that count as perceptual,’ (2010: 396). 
 Understood in this way, constancies provide focal points for enquiry into the very 
nature of perception. Correlatively, specific perceptual capacities, such as visual shape, 
orientation, or colour perception, may be approached by unpacking the details of constancies 
for shape, orientation, or colour. We can distinguish two ways of tackling this project. The 
first, which is characteristic of much philosophy of perception, focuses on the complex, fully-
fledged constancy capacities involved in our (presumably) normal adult human experience. 
The second, less frequently encountered approach targets the other end of the continuum: 
what are the most primitive types of perceptual constancy? What are the basic constituents or 
components of the mature capacity? What do these reveal about the lower borders of 
perception and representational mind? This paper applies this second approach to the case of 
colour, developing an account of a particularly basic type of colour constancy. So basic, in 
fact, that it is initially unclear whether it deserves the label ‘colour constancy’ at all.  
 The account develops as a response to the paradox of colour constancy (section 1). 
The paradox concerns cases of cerebral achromatopsia, a loss of colour consciousness 
following cortical injury. Complete cerebral achromatopsics lack any awareness of colour, 
seeing the world in shades of grey. Bizarrely, however, some such patients show signs of 
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possessing colour constancy. This is inconsistent with the intuitive, apparently tautological 
view that colour constancy involves constancy of perceived colour. The argument starts by 
identifying and rejecting a key assumption that helps generate the paradox: monism about 
colour constancy. I argue instead for pluralism about our constancy capacities, which opens 
the door for alternative concepts fitted to the achromatopsic case (section 2). I start this 
constructive project by outlining the fundamental but neglected relationship between colour 
constancy and contrast. I argue that the preservation of key types of contrast processing 
justifies the attribution of constancy in achromatopsia (section 3). Although much of this 
argumentation appeals to low-level facts about the visual system, it clarifies the close ties 
between two perceptual phenomena – constancy and contrast – which feature in many 
philosophical debates, but which are often treated quite differently. This argument does, 
nonetheless, leave open the person-level, conscious bases for this basic constancy capacity. 
The final section draws up the relevant connections. I argue for the chromatic edge 
hypothesis, on which the constancy in question involves perceptually representing chromatic 
contrast properties ‘at’ the edges of surfaces. This implicates constancies associated with the 
so-called ‘colour for form’ function, as distinct from the ‘colour for colouring’ function most 
canonically associated with colour perception (section 4). Such chromatic edge constancy is 




1. The Paradox of Colour Constancy 
What is colour constancy? There is, of course, substantial disagreement on this issue.1  I 
nonetheless think that most parties would accept this first-pass characterisation: 
Constancy for Colours: Colour constancy is constancy with respect to the perceived 
colours of objects viewed under changing/varying illumination. 
One finds similar descriptions in the introductory sections of many philosophical and 
scientific works on colour constancy. To pick a prominent example of each, Hilbert (2005: 
141) defines ‘colour constancy’ as ‘constancy with respect to the perceived colours of 
surfaces’ under changes in lighting, while Arend and Reeves (1986: 1743) stipulate that 
constancy is ‘a process whereby perceived object colours remain invariant under changes of 
illuminant colour’. I take it that such characterisations are intended to provide a neutral 
starting point for theorising.2 Prima facie, they seem unobjectionable. Indeed, it seems truistic 
that colour constancy is perceptual constancy for colour, which presumably just is constancy 
with respect to perceived colour. 
 There are two immediate points on this characterisation. The first is that it is circular, 
using the term ‘constancy’ on both sides. Arend and Reeves use the term ‘invariant,’ rather 
than ‘constant,’ but this does not clarify matters. Further explication of this notion is therefore 
required, but that is only to be expected, given the pre-theoretical status of the definition. The 
second – and for our purposes, more significant – point is that constancy is defined in terms 
of ‘perceived colour.’ This point has two important implications. The first is that Constancy 
                                                     
1 Recent discussion includes Brown (2014), Cohen (2008), Davies (2016, 2018), Gert (2010), 
Hilbert (2005), and Wright (2013). 
2 Notably, Constancy for Colours is neutral on the issue of colour ontology. 
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for Colours entails that any subject with colour constancy must have a capacity to perceive 
colours. If colour constancy just is constancy with respect to perceived colours, then no 
perceived colours means no colour constancy. The second, related implication is that we have 
a prior, independent grasp of the notion of ‘perceived colour,’ such that it may play the 
envisaged role in helping to explicate the notion of ‘colour constancy.’ That is, ‘perceived 
colour’ is presumed to be analytically prior to ‘colour constancy.’ What notion of ‘perceived 
colour’ is in play here? Again bearing in mind its pre-theoretical status, a suitably neutral 
gloss is that the perceived colour of X (for S, at t) is the colour property that S’s visual 
experience at t presents X as having. Plugging this into Constancy for Colours, colour 
constancy is constancy (invariance) with respect to the colour properties that one’s visual 
experience presents an object as having, under changes or variations in illumination. And this 
does seem to be the intuitive view. 
Our puzzle concerns putative cases of constancy in subjects who lack the ability to 
perceive colours in this sense. These are subjects with cerebral achromatopsia (from hereon, 
achromatopsia), a rare condition involving a selective impairment in the ability to have 
conscious visual experiences of chromatic colour.3 Unlike more common forms of colour 
blindness, achromatopsia involves cortical damage, rather than retinal abnormalities, (hence, 
‘cortical colour blindness’). Mollon and colleagues (1980) found three fully functional retinal 
cone mechanisms in a complete achromatopsic known as ‘MS’. MS’s spectral sensitivity 
function was also found to be consistent with the presence of cone-opponent processing 
(Heywood et al., 1996). Yet due to their brain injury, complete achromatopsics describe their 
visual world as ‘drab and grey’ (Cowey & Heywood, 1995: 90) or ‘drained of colour’ 
(Heywood et al., 1987: 22). Indeed, they are unable to perform standard diagnostic tests for 
                                                     
3 From hereon, I suppress ‘chromatic.’ 
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colour vision: they cannot discriminate isoluminant stimuli in respect of colour, accurately 
name the colours, nor produce appropriate orderings of colour chips in the Farnsworth-
Munsell 100 hue test. 
 Despite this profound impairment of colour consciousness, several authors have 
reported evidence of preserved colour constancy in achromatopsia. A study by Hurlbert and 
colleagues (1998: 143) concludes that MS has ‘rudimentary colour constancy… mediated by 
the computation of cone contrasts between image regions.’ Reporting this work prior to 
publication, Cowey and Heywood (1997: 135) claim that ‘M.S. has normal colour 
constancy…’ In an influential review article, Smithson (2005: 1342) concurs that ‘a 
cerebrally achromatic [sic] observer … [was] able to display colour constancy in an 
asymmetric matching paradigm.’ Another study by Barbur and colleagues (2004: 25), 
involving different stimulus conditions, found that ‘either normal or slightly reduced, but 
functioning, ICC [instantaneous colour constancy] mechanisms are present in [three] 
achromatopsic subject[s].’ 
This brings us to the paradox of colour constancy. On the one hand, we have a 
reasonable scientific consensus that achromatopsics have at least ‘rudimentary’ colour 
constancy. These reports come from leading experts in the field, and therefore have 
considerable prima facie credibility.4 On the other hand, we have Constancy for Colours. This 
apparent truism tells us that colour constancy involves invariance with respect to the 
perceived colours of surfaces under changes or variations in illumination. But achromatopsics 
                                                     
4 I stress: prima facie credibility. The question of whether this capacity in fact warrants the 
label ‘colour constancy’ is a substantive philosophical issue, which cannot be settled by 
appeal to empirical authority. Section 2 provides an extended argument in support of 
classifying the capacity in this way. 
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cannot perceive colours! The intuitive characterisation of constancy therefore gets no grip 
here whatsoever. 
Clearly, something has to give, but what exactly? The most obvious response is to 
reject one of the assumptions that generates the paradox. Unfortunately, however, neither 
option is straightforward. Firstly, we might take issue with Constancy for Colours. In 
particular, perhaps it was a mistake to define ‘colour constancy’ in terms of ‘perceived 
colour,’ where this implied a capacity to have conscious visual experiences that present the 
colours of objects. One might argue that this starting point is insufficiently neutral, in barring 
colour constancy in human or non-human animals that lack conscious awareness of colour. 
One alternative would be to unpack ‘perceived colour’ in more functional representational 
terms, rather than in terms of properties presented in visual experience.5 Glossing over 
important details, such a view might allow for perceptual representations of colour in 
creatures that lack conscious awareness of colour. On this view, the attribution of constancy 
in achromatopsia might be vindicated, if these subjects were to possess a non-conscious 
capacity for representing object colours, which exhibited the relevant type of illumination-
invariance. That is, adopting this view may resolve our paradox, if it turned out that 
achromatopsics possess a kind of blindsight for object colour.6 
                                                     
5 This approach is discernible in Burge (2010: 368, 374-76, 402) and Matthen (1999: 78). 
6 ‘Blindsight’ here means type 1 blindsight, where patients supposedly have no conscious 
awareness of stimuli presented in the impaired visual field, yet can discriminate some of their 
properties. Type 2 blindsighters have some residual awareness of stimuli in their ‘blind’ field, 
which facilitates discrimination. This residual awareness might be severely degraded or 
unusual. I consider the possibility that MS has degraded awareness of colour below. 
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Whatever the merits of the functional representational view, it will not help us here. 
That is because the putative constancy capacities in achromatopsia, mysteriously enough, 
seem to involve conscious perception.7 I say more on this later, but to be clear, it seems that 
achromatopsics can perform certain paradigmatic colour constancy tasks using conscious 
perception, despite apparently lacking any awareness of the colours of the stimuli. No 
tweaking of Constancy for Colours will help in accommodating this. Only a radical revision 
will suffice, somehow reshaping the notion to cover constancies that do not even imply the 
ability to perceptually represent colours. Such an extreme departure is too much to swallow, 
at least straight off the bat. 
Perhaps we should therefore question the scientific consensus. It might have been 
premature to describe achromatopsics as ‘colour constant,’ purely on the basis of their ability 
to perform certain psychophysical constancy tasks. After all, it would not be the first time 
psychologists have over-extended mentalistic notions, in attempting to explain seemingly 
intelligent or complex behaviours. Perhaps, then, we should look for an alternative, 
deflationary explanation of the achromatopsic data, which prescinds from attributing 
constancy proper. 
Now, although this strategy may seem more promising, it is still problematic. Firstly, 
we are owed an account as to why the experts should want to attribute constancy in 
achromatopsia in the first place. After all, it is not as if they are unaware of the puzzling 
ramifications. Hurlbert and colleagues (1998: 143), for example, note that ‘at first sight, it 
seems paradoxical to test colour constancy in a cerebrally achromatopsic observer.’ The 
implication being: at first sight, but not on closer inspection. Secondly, while the previous 
response seemed worryingly revisionary, the deflationary response arguably seems guilty of 
                                                     
7 Heywood et al. (1994: 251; 1998: 413-15). 
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parochialism. On the face of it, the reports of constancy in achromatopsia look like a 
discovery, rather than a gross conceptual error. Of course, these claims are hard to 
understand, given the ordinary concept of constancy. But the history of psychology and 
philosophy of mind is littered with theoretical advances stemming from previously 
unimaginable dissociations. Why not here? The possibility at least warrants closer 
investigation. 
As should be clear by now, there is no quick and easy resolution to the paradox of 
colour constancy. The remainder of the paper takes up the challenge, developing a response 
that respects, as I think we ought, both Constancy for Colours and the scientific consensus. 
The first stage of the argument rejects an important, unarticulated assumption that helps 
generate the puzzle: monism about colour constancy. The resulting pluralism opens the door 
for alternative concepts, which may depart from Constancy for Colours in fundamental ways 
– even to the extent of allowing types of constancy in the absence of any perceptual 
representation of colour. 
2. Pluralism 
In presenting Constancy for Colours as a definition of ‘colour constancy,’ the implicit 
suggestion was that the term was monosemous, and that constancy is a singular, unified 
phenomenon. As a matter of fact, it is not. I have previously defended the following view 
(Davies, 2016, 2018): 
Pluralism: There are different types of colour constancy, involving different 
perceptual capacities. These capacities are individuated by differences in 
environmental conditions, computational description, representational content, 
mechanism, and aspects of phenomenal character. 
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Pluralism is not motivated by naïve reflection on visual experience, rather by close attention 
to empirical practice. In vision science, I think that pluralism is in fact the standard view, 
though this is rarely made explicit. For example, an influential review by Smithson (2005: 
1329) details ‘the sensory, computational and cognitive aspects of human colour constancy.’ 
She distinguishes models based on adaptation, involving multiplicative scaling of cone 
signals, such as the Ives transform and von Kries coefficient rule; a range of computational 
models aimed at providing estimates of the illuminant; and models of ‘operational [i.e. 
relational] colour constancy’ based on ‘coding colour relations by ratios’ of cone-excitation 
values (2005: 1334). Foster (2011: 696) draws similar distinctions, concluding that, 
multiple mechanisms underlie constancy judgments, each providing cues to the state 
and stability of the observed surface, object, or scene... Which surface-colour attribute 
is given perceptual prominence may depend simply on the task at hand, but at present 
it is not possible to identify uniquely either the neural substrate for these attributes or 
how they are combined with other non-chromatic attributes to determine surface-
colour appearance. 
Granzier and Valsecchi (2014: 4) echo these thoughts, 
colour constancy might be like a “bag of tricks”; the kind of information and the 
combination of information that will be used by the visual system will depend on the 
task at hand…, the observer…, and the presence of the information itself…. 
These remarks speak resoundingly in favour of pluralism. 
 To illustrate concretely, let’s briefly compare models that estimate the illuminant with 
models of relational constancy. Simplifying significantly, the computational problem 
addressed by the former is to produce representations of the colours at each point on a surface 
that is viewed under changing (or varying) illumination, despite the fact that surface and 
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illuminant properties are confounded in the proximal stimulation of the visual system. The 
basic form of the solution is to generate a representation (an ‘estimate’) of the illuminant, in 
order to ‘discount’ its contribution to the incoming signal. The estimate formation may recruit 
various ‘cues’ in the scene, such as average chromaticity, specular highlights, shadows, and 
more besides. It is notoriously controversial as to what the perceptual corollary of such 
computational processes might be, but the mainstream, broadly empiricist view is that it 
involves a non-sensory, quasi-cognitive, perhaps conceptualised aspect of perceptual 
experience; more recently, a ‘projective’ or ‘distal’ mode of perceptual representation.8 
Relational models, in contrast, involve no estimation of the illuminant. Given some change in 
proximal stimulation from two points p and q, the problem is to determine whether this was 
due to an illuminant change, or a change in surface colour properties. The solution, roughly, 
is to compare the stimulation from p and q before and after the change, with invariant ratios 
indicating an illuminant change, and variant ratios indicating a surface colour change. (More 
on this later.) Such relational constancy is strongest under conditions of rapidly changing 
illumination, and is not significantly attenuated by reducing cues as to the illumination. The 
perceptual corollary of relational constancy is again up for debate. For now, let us suppose, 
minimally, that we in some sense perceive the colour relations between p and q as invariant 
under illumination changes, even while their ‘absolute’ colour values may vary quite 
significantly. 
In philosophy, pluralism is endorsed by Wright (2013), and is implicit in Burge 
(2010).9 Wright (2013: 436) argues that there are ‘two forms of colour constancy, one 
                                                     
8 For ‘projective’, see Reeves et al. (2008). For ‘distal’, see Palmer (1999). 
9 Pluralism is also implicit in Brown (2014), who distinguishes between illumination-
independent and transparency-independent constancy. 
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phenomenal and the other projective.’ Following Reeves and colleagues (2008), he associates 
the ‘phenomenal’ kind with processes of adaptation, while the ‘projective’ kind is tied to 
processes of ‘inference.’ Wright (2013: 443ff) also discusses relational constancy, and seems 
to allow that this might be a third type. As will emerge later, my view differs from Wright in 
positing a greater multiplicity of types, distinguishing illumination-independent and 
background-independent colour constancy.10 Burge (2010: 351ff) provides a detailed 
description of a basic type of lightness constancy, in which the visual system exploits 
systematic differences in ‘luminance contours in the sensory registration’ of light, in order to 
distinguish illumination edges from reflectance edges. Roughly, sharp luminance contours 
typically correspond to reflectance edges, whereas fuzzy contours correspond to illumination 
edges.11 Burge (2010: 354) adds that ‘the full lightness constancy capacity in humans is more 
complex than the capacity I have described, which is only a component in the full capacity.’ 
The notion of a ‘component’ capacity suggests that the edge-categorisation process itself 
constitutes a type of lightness constancy. This indicates pluralism, though it is also consistent 
with the monistic view that only the ‘full capacity’ is lightness constancy proper, with the 
‘components’ constituting mere parts of the mechanism that sustains it. I shall not rehash the 
previous points in arguing against the latter view. 
Much more could be said about the motivations for pluralism, but this would distract 
from our main aim: resolving the paradox of colour constancy. To recap, the paradox arose 
                                                     
10 I also distinguish atmosphere-independent colour constancy, which I will discuss in future 
work.  
11 As Adelson & Pentland (1996) note, however, sharp luminance edges can arise in natural 
scenes from both reflectance changes and illumination changes. Other heuristics must 
therefore be at work in distinguishing these distal changes. 
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by conjoining Constancy for Colours with the scientific consensus concerning achromatopsia. 
We already rejected the possibility of revising Constancy for Colours to accommodate the 
putative achromatopsic cases. Such a revision would be too radical, alienating us from any 
intuitive grip on the phenomenon. Pluralism facilitates a more nuanced approach. Let’s begin 
by noting that, even granting pluralism, all parties should agree that Constancy for Colours is 
central to our understanding of colour constancy. It plausibly provides an exemplar 
characterisation, helping to identify core cases of the full mature capacity. But it would be a 
mistake to define ‘colour constancy’ with reference to such cases, as requiring ‘constancy in 
respect of perceived colour.’ This would preclude – as a matter of definition – a capacity such 
as relational colour constancy, which involves constancy in respect of perceived colour 
relations, rather than colours per se. Similarly, defining ‘lightness constancy’ as ‘constancy in 
respect of perceived lightness’ would preclude the capacity that Burge discusses, involving 
the categorisation of illumination edges and reflectance edges. We should reject such 
conceptual hegemony. Both capacities involve forming objectifying perceptual 
representations of distal features: respectively, colour similarity relations between objects, 
and boundaries of material surfaces and regions of illumination. Both involve the operation of 
computational principles that function to disentangle the contributions of certain distal 
features to the proximal stimulation of the visual system. Both capacities constitute 
perceptual constancies, according to the science. Neither involves ‘constancy in respect of 
perceived colour (lightness),’ in the intuitive sense of that phrase. 
In tackling our puzzle, then, we may combine a certain conservatism regarding 
Constancy for Colours, considered as a core conception, with a more open-minded view 
about the various forms that colour constancy might take, once we unpack the constituent 
capacities comprising the mature condition. And within this framework, it is legitimate to 
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ask: does the heralded capacity in achromatopsia in fact constitute a type of colour 
constancy? If so, what type exactly? The next two sections tackle these questions in turn. 
3. Contrast and Constancy in Achromatopsia 
In introducing the paradox, the scientific consensus provided prima facie grounds for 
believing that achromatopsics possess a type of colour constancy. Clearly, however, such an 
appeal to authority provides no cogent philosophical reason for endorsing this attribution. 
The aim of this section, firstly, is to develop a philosophical framework within which we can 
start to make sense of this puzzle. And secondly, to deploy this framework to argue that the 
presaged capacity in achromatopsia does indeed constitute a type of constancy. The 
framework outlines the close relationship between colour contrast and colour constancy. Both 
phenomena are, to a significant extent, products of the cone contrast code employed at low 
levels in the visual system. To substantiate this point, I highlight some properties of cone 
contrast processing that are especially important to constancy. I then argue that some 
complete achromatopsics possess the relevant sort of contrast processing, which moreover 
appears to have upshots in conscious experience, hence should be credited with a very basic 
form of colour constancy. I refine this claim by considering some objections, and offering 
replies. The section closes with discussion of the wider philosophical implications of this 
view. 
 To begin, we must distinguish two different notions of contrast. The familiar kind is 
colour contrast, which concerns the relationship between the apparent colour of an object, 
and the apparent colour of its surround. So-called colour contrast effects are cases in which 
the colour that an object visually appears to have differs quite substantially, when viewed 
against backgrounds of differing colours. Figure 1 illustrates such effects for (a) achromatic 
and (b) chromatic colours. In 1(a) and 1(b), the two discs have exactly the same surface 
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properties, but the left-hand disc in 1(a) appears darker than the right-hand disc, and the left-
hand disc in 1(b) appears slightly more reddish than the right-hand disc. Such contrast effects 
have long been a source of scepticism about the mind-independence or objectivity of colour. 
What colour is the left-hand disc in 1(b) really? It seems that nothing privileges one or other 
background as more favourable in determining the colour of the disc. As such, there is just as 
much reason for thinking that the disc has the colour that it appears to have on the right-hand 
side, as that it has the colour it appears to have on the left. Given the equipollence of these 
judgements, the only rational options seemingly are either to conclude that the disc has both 
colours, or that it has neither.12 
 
Figure 1 
 The second type of contrast is cone contrast, which concerns the relative activity of 
receptoral cone cells across temporal or spatial intervals. Let’s abbreviate the photon catch 
from point p in cone class L as L(p) – similarly for M or S cones. One simple type of cone 
contrast is the spatial ratio of cone excitation between two points, within a single cone class: 
L(p)/L(q). We could also take the temporal ratio of excitation from a single point at 
                                                     
12 For ‘both’, see Cohen (2009). For ‘neither’, see Hardin (1988). Mind-independent realists 
would reject the initial reasoning. Byrne & Hilbert (2003), for example, argue that the 
mistake is to assume that if the disc really does have one colour rather than the other, we 
must be in a position to know which colour it has. 
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successive times: L(p)/L(p’). As will be familiar, the early visual system compares the 
outputs of different receptor types, yielding at least three opponent channels. The standard, 
simplified model includes an (L+M) or ‘achromatic’ channel, (L-M) or ‘red-green’ channel, 
and (S-(L+M)) or ‘yellow-blue’ channel.13 For our purposes, it will be convenient also to 
introduce MacLeod and Boynton’s (1979) chromaticity diagram, which represents the two 
chromatically opponent channels via an [L/(L+M)] or ‘red-green’ axis, and an [S/(L+M)] or 
‘yellow-violet’ axis. Let’s represent the [L/(L+M)] value of p as RG(p), and the [S/(L+M)] 
value as YV(p). The spatial contrast between RG(p) and RG(q) can be represented by the 
distance │RG(p)-RG(q)│. Let’s call these cone-opponent contrasts. All incoming spectral 
information is coded via contrasts of some such sort: the visual system works with relative 
rather than absolute cone and cone-opponent values. Although this is far from the whole 
story, contrast signals are of fundamental importance in understanding many colour-related 
phenomena. As Hardin (1988: 15) augurs, ‘this selective emphasis on contrast at such an 
early level of visual processing is bound to have a powerful effect on what we see.’ 
 One such phenomenon, predictably, is colour contrast. Consider image 1(b) again. 
The orange disc presented against the green background signals a greater ‘red-green’ cone-
opponent contrast than the disc presented against the red background. As such, a mechanism 
with combined chromatic and spatial opponency, computing something like │RG(p)-RG(q)│ 
values for the disc/background pairs, would produce higher levels of activity with the 
orange/green pair than with the orange/red pair. Such ‘double-opponent’ mechanisms abound 
                                                     
13 The scare quotes are intended to flag the poorly understood relationship between activity in 
early cone-opponent channels, and the opponent structure of our perceptual experience of 
shades of red, green, and so on. It is surely just as much a mistake to label an (L-M) channel a 
‘red-green’ channel, as it is to label an L cone a ‘red’ cone. 
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in primary visual cortex.14 Now, clearly there is a significant leap from here to facts 
concerning our visual experience of these pairs. I’m not lining up to deliver the relevant 
bridging principles. We can confidently say, however, that the manifest differences in our 
experiences of these pairs are predicted rather well by the differences in spatial cone-
opponent contrasts – at least for simple stimuli of this sort. 
 Another phenomenon that is intricately linked to cone contrast, perhaps less 
predictably, is colour constancy. To be clear, this connection is common knowledge among 
vision scientists, having been noted in empirical literature for over two hundred years 
(Mollon, 2006). Among philosophers, however, as noted above, contrast phenomena are 
often cited as reasons to think that colour is, in some sense, perceiver-dependent. Conversely, 
constancy has been touted as providing some of the strongest motivation for mind-
independent realism.15 As we shall now see, however, colour contrast and colour constancy 
are, to a significant extent, two sides of the same coin, in terms of their underpinnings in cone 
contrast processing. 
 To help bring this out, first notice that just as differences in cone(-opponent) contrast 
predict differences in colour appearance (at least under simplified viewing conditions), 
equivalent cone contrasts should predict sameness in colour appearance, assuming other 
factors are held constant. The latter hypothesis is known as the cone contrast rule (Whittle, 
2003). Figure 2 illustrates a case in which this is borne out quite strikingly, if only 
approximately. In 2(a), the squares in the top and bottom rows were carefully chosen to 
                                                     
14 For example, see Conway (2001). 
15 Byrne & Hilbert (2003) argue from colour constancy to reflectance physicalism about 
colour. Allen (2016: Ch2) argues from constancy to the mind-independence of colour, 
addressing various critical responses to Byrne & Hilbert. 
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produce the same relative cone responses with their respective backgrounds. That is, in 
column 1, the cone contrasts between the top square and the grey background are identical to 
the contrasts between the bottom square and the green background. Now, although there are 
some discernible differences in the appearance of these squares, they appear very similar. 
Compare this with 2(b), which shows the exact same squares as 2(a) – that is, corresponding 
squares have the same absolute colour values – but all against a uniform grey background. 
The two rows now appear quite different. For me, this is especially marked in columns 3 and 
4. 
   
Figure 2, reprinted with permission from Hurlbert (1996) 
 Let’s reflect on the phenomenology of image 2(a) a bit more. Although the display is 
artificial and contains no explicit cues as to the illuminant, a natural interpretation is that 2(a) 
displays the same row of squares under two different lights: a fairly neutral light on the top 
row, and a greenish light on the bottom row. Alternatively, on the bottom row, it might seem 
as if one is viewing the same set of squares through a green transparency. This is no accident. 
As it turns out, for almost every change in illumination that we ordinarily encounter, the 
corresponding change in cone excitations preserves spatial contrasts within each cone class.16 
                                                     




That is, for natural illuminants A and B, L(p)/L(q) under A  L(p)/L(q) under B. This is the 
illumination-invariance of cone contrasts, or invariance of cone excitation ratios (Foster & 
Nascimento, 1994; Foster, 2011: §5.3). Significantly, cone-opponent contrasts exhibit the 
same, if not slightly higher degrees of illumination-invariance.17 That is, for example, 
│RG(p)-RG(q)│ under A  │RG(p)-RG(q)│ under B. This is one of the most profound 
features of the visual processing of colour. To illustrate, each point in Figure 3 represents a 
pair of excitation ratios within a single cone class (a = L, b = M, c = S), between two 
randomly chosen surfaces in a natural scene, viewed under skylight and sunlight. These ratios 
fall very close to the diagonal, which represents perfect equivalence across the illuminant 
change. The pattern holds for any two illuminants drawn at random from the daylight set, and 
with objects drawn from a sample of 640,000 reflectance spectra gathered from natural 
scenes (Nascimento et al., 2002).  
 
Figure 3, reprinted with permission from Foster (2011) 
The almost perfect illumination-invariance of cone contrasts has a corollary in human 
behaviour. In a paradigm developed by David Foster and his collaborators, subjects are 
                                                     
17 Foster (2011: 692), Foster et al. (2000: 181), Linnell & Foster (1996: 226), Zaidi (1998: 
1772), and Zaidi et al. (1997). 
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presented with a reference stimulus, alongside (simultaneous) or followed by (successive) a 
test stimulus that either preserves (‘illumination condition’) or violates (‘surface condition’) 
the cone excitation ratios in the reference stimulus.18 Subjects are asked to judge whether the 
difference/change they encounter is a difference/change in illumination, or in the surface 
material properties of the stimulus. We are exquisitely attuned to this difference, routinely 
judging a change that preserves cone ratios to be a change in illumination, and a change that 
violates these ratios as a change in surface properties. This discriminatory capacity is usually 
taken to operationalise relational colour constancy, discussed above. To reiterate, then, it is 
no accident that we see image 2(a) as presenting the same set of squares under two different 
illuminants, given that the cone contrasts between squares and backgrounds are the same in 
the two rows. 
On my framework, then, some types of colour constancy are conceived as corollaries 
or consequences of the illumination-invariance of cone contrasts. To be clear, I do not think 
that this framework is apt to explain all types of colour constancy. One lesson of pluralism is 
that we should not expect a one-size-fits-all account. Nonetheless, the framework seems apt 
to explain so-called ‘appearance-based’ or ‘phenomenal’ colour constancy,19 at least in part, 
and relational colour constancy. This framework has a number of advantages, in the present 
context. 
Firstly, it highlights a basic computational means of distinguishing changes in 
proximal stimulation that are due to the illumination, from changes that are due to surface 
colour properties. As noted in section 2, regarding relational colour constancy, the associated 
                                                     
18 The seminal works are Craven & Foster (1992) on successive constancy, and Foster et al. 
(1992) on simultaneous constancy. 
19 See Davies (2016) and Wright (2013). 
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mechanisms need only compute spatial or temporal ratios of cone excitation, and assess 
whether these ratios are invariant, (in which case the variation/change is likely due to the 
illumination), or variant (likely due to a variation/change in surface colour). Mechanisms 
such as these seem promising, from the perspective of limning the most basic kinds of colour 
constancy. 
Secondly, these mechanisms subserve a robust, well-documented perceptual capacity: 
the ability to discriminate, on the basis of vision, between differences/changes in 
illumination, and differences/changes in surface colour properties. I noted above that this 
discriminatory capacity is usually taken to operationalise relational colour constancy. Which 
is to say, this capacity is not necessarily grounded in any invariance in one’s experience of 
the ‘absolute’ colour values of objects. In fact, as also noted above, the actual perceptual 
bases for these discriminations are not yet clear: I tendered only that such discriminations 
indicate that one in some sense perceives the colour relations between objects as invariant 
under illumination changes, and variant under surface colour changes. This 
phenomenological neutrality is advantageous here, as it leaves open the question of how 
information about colour relations may be conveyed to one in visual experience. Such 
information may, of course, be conveyed in different ways, at different times. The framework 
thus allows for productive speculation as to whether, and if so, how such information may be 
conveyed even to an achromatopsic subject, despite their inability to perceive the colours of 
things. To pre-empt what lies ahead, my view is that awareness of qualities of the edges of 
surfaces may serve just this function. 
I now set this framework into action, in addressing our puzzle. Crucially, despite 
being severely impaired in their conscious experience of colour, some complete 
achromatopsics are able to discriminate illumination changes from surface colour changes, 
indicating visual sensitivity to preservations and violations, respectively, of cone excitation 
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ratios. I shall now set out the details of one such case, and argue that it constitutes a genuine 
case of colour constancy, albeit of an extremely unusual and impoverished kind. 
Hurlbert and colleagues (1998) tested MS using a simultaneous asymmetric colour-
matching task, involving two types of stimuli. The simple stimuli were uniformly coloured 
square patches set against similarly uniform coloured backgrounds. The complex stimuli 
involved the same coloured patches set against coloured Mondrian backgrounds. The 
reference patches were greenish-yellow, blue, blue-green, and purple, with additional 
yellowish-green and orange patches used in some conditions. For simple stimuli, the 
reference background was a neutral grey under a simulated daylight illuminant. Test patches 
were generated by shifting the cone coordinates of the reference patches in one of three ways: 
an L+M shift, L-M shift, or S shift. The same shift was applied to the reference background, 
so that test patch-background pairs had the same cone ratios as the corresponding reference 
stimulus. MS was tested using a single interval forced-choice paradigm. Each test stimulus 
was presented alongside one of two possible matching alternatives: an ‘incorrect’ match, or a 
‘correct’ match. The ‘correct’ match would be the original reference patch-background pair 
from which the test was derived, which therefore had the same cone contrasts. The ‘incorrect’ 
match would be the test-shifted patch against the original reference background. This 
alternative patch therefore had the same absolute cone coordinates as the test patch, but 
different cone contrasts. The task was to say whether the two stimuli were the same or 
different. As intimated by Hurlbert and colleagues (1998: 136), the task effectively probes 
whether MS’s responses fit the normal pattern predicted by the cone contrast rule, which 
manifests a ‘form of colour constancy’ (1998: 137), for reasons discussed above. 
 Surprisingly, MS displayed near normal discrimination performance for both 
achromatic L+M and chromatic L-M shifted stimuli. His d-prime for the L-M stimuli was 
0.98, or 69% correct. For L+M stimuli, his d-prime was around 2.4, but this difference was 
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largely attributable to the fact that the average cone contrast distance for L+M stimuli was 
around four times larger than for L-M stimuli. MS was unable, however, to discriminate 
differences in S-cone contrast alone. Significantly, MS was also completely unable to 
discriminate chromatic contrast with complex stimuli. I return to this point later. 
 One immediate worry is that MS is perhaps picking up on differences in luminance, 
or luminance contrast between the correct and incorrect matching alternatives. Perhaps 
contrasts of this sort produced discriminable differences in the perceived lightness – that is, 
the achromatic colours – of the stimuli, of which MS was aware. But there were no 
differences in luminance, hence luminance contrast, between the correct and incorrect 
matching alternatives: they differed solely in chromatic or L-M contrast (1998: 138). A 
further control experiment confirmed that MS could not have been responding to luminance 
contrast (1998: 141). Other studies confirm that MS is able to detect the presence of features 
defined solely by chromatic contrast, despite random temporal or spatial luminance masking 
(Barbur et al. 1994; Heywood et al., 1994). 
  A second worry is that the ‘correct’ matches in this experiment might not be those 
chosen by a healthy, colour constant subject. In a further control, however, a healthy subject 
completed an asymmetric colour matching task with the same test patch-background 
combinations, using matching-by-adjustment rather than forced-choice discrimination. The 
healthy subject’s preferred matches fell ‘almost exactly on the equal-cone-contrast line,’ 
(1998: 142), although there was more deviation from perfect S-cone contrast. That is, the 
points at which test and reference patches appeared the same in respect of hue, saturation, and 
luminance, closely corresponded to the points at which the patches had equivalent cone 
contrasts with their respective backgrounds. Accordingly, in successfully discriminating 
contrast-preserving from contrast-violating alternatives, MS is discriminating stimuli that 
exhibit high versus low degrees of colour constancy for a healthy subject. 
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 These points, while important, largely reflect concerns about the empirical details. A 
more philosophically minded worry is that, even taken at face value, the data only establish a 
behavioural or extensional equivalence between MS and healthy, reasonably colour constant 
subjects. Such equivalence does not suffice to show that the perceptual basis for MS’s 
discriminations constitutes a genuine type of constancy. After all, when healthy subjects 
perform well on such tasks, they do so by attending to the colours of the stimuli. Their colour 
constancy does not lie in the discriminatory behaviour: it lies in the perceptual response, in 
how they see things colour-wise. Interesting as it may be, the objection runs, MS’s 
discriminatory behaviour is not really the issue. Either MS is completely colour blind, as 
advertised, in which case he could not possibly have colour constancy in the usual sense; or 
MS is not completely colour blind after all, in which case he is presumably just 
discriminating these stimuli on the basis of how they look to him colour-wise. 
 Let me start with the second horn of this objection. It has been suggested that MS 
might have some residual visual experience of colour, but of a degraded or unusual sort. For 
example, MS might see ‘partial colours,’ qualities defined by at most two of the standard 
three dimensions of hue, saturation, and lightness.20 Alternatively, MS might see ‘alien 
colours,’ properties located in quality spaces quite different to our own hue, saturation, and 
lightness space.21 It is impossible to rule out these possibilities completely. In other work, 
however, I have argued that neither proposal is especially plausible (Davies, 2021). In any 
event, in the next section I present what I take to be a more probable explanation. 
I shall therefore focus here on the first horn of the objection. My first point is that 
colour constancy in the ‘usual sense’ presumably entails a capacity to perceive colours, in 
                                                     
20 Brown (2014: 14ff). 
21 MacPherson (2015).  
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line with Constancy for Colours. In arguing for pluralism, however, I have already 
established that this concept does not exhaust the possible forms that colour constancy may 
take. The real issue, as I see it, is whether MS has colour constancy in any sense. And 
admittedly, thus far, the only real evidence for this claim is that MS performs reasonably well 
on a standard psychophysical colour constancy task. What further reasons can be supplied?  
My first argument focuses on the relationship between MS’s discriminatory abilities 
and the environmental conditions involved in normal cases of colour constancy. In 
summarising the constancy experiments, I claimed that MS successfully discriminated stimuli 
that either preserved or violated achromatic (L+M) or chromatic (L-M) cone excitation ratios. 
Considered in the void, such discrimination bears no obvious connection to colour constancy. 
Constancy involves the discrimination of distal conditions, involving surface colour and 
illumination, not proximal conditions, such as cone excitation ratios.22 Recall, however, that 
changes in daylight illumination almost flawlessly preserve such ratios, whereas changes in 
surface colour properties routinely change them (Foster & Nascimento, 1994; Foster, 2011: 
§5.3). As such, the capacity to discriminate stimuli that preserve or violate such ratios is, ipso 
facto, a capacity to perceptually discriminate illumination changes from surface colour 
changes. But if a subject is capable of perceptually discriminating illumination changes from 
surface colour changes, then her visual system must be processing the incoming perceptual 
signal in a way that distinguishes changes in the signal that are likely due to changes in the 
illumination, from those likely due to changes in surface colour. Any visual system that can 
do these things, in my view, is a system that exhibits colour constancy.23 For it is plausibly a 
minimal, core part of any understanding of colour constancy, that it requires possessing a 
                                                     
22 Cf. Burge (2010: 396ff) for related points. 
23 I provide a lengthier defence of this claim in Davies (2018). 
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visual system that can distinguish or disentangle the contribution of the illumination and 
surface colour to the incoming perceptual signal, and produce therefrom some sort of 
differential perceptual response to the two types of environmental condition. MS’s visual 
system does these things; hence, his discriminatory ability suffices for colour constancy.  
 My second argument is that the neurological evidence suggests that MS retains some 
key mechanisms of colour constancy – though he clearly lacks others. These include retinal 
mechanisms and, crucially for my view, early cortical mechanisms. Regarding the former, 
given his intact retinal cone systems (Mollon et al., 1980), MS likely possesses retinal 
mechanisms of light adaptation, such as von Kries scaling. Retinal light adaptation is 
universally thought to make a significant contribution to appearance-based or phenomenal 
colour constancy, involving invariance in respect of hue-saturation content. When 
experimental conditions are conducive to high levels of adaptation, phenomenal constancy is 
correspondingly robust.24 In this connection, it is significant that MS underwent dichoptic 
presentation of the test and reference stimuli, with an adaptation period of two minutes to the 
respective background illuminants. This would have engaged retinal adaptation mechanisms, 
if MS had them. These mechanisms therefore plausibly form at least part of the explanation 
of MS’s discrimination performance, although of course it remains unclear, for now, how 
such activity might shape his visual experience, in the absence of hue-saturation content. 
 It is unlikely, however, that retinal adaptation mechanisms were the sole driver, 
perhaps even the main driver of MS’s performance. Recall that MS was only able to 
discriminate cone contrasts for simple stimuli. When stimuli were presented against complex 
Mondrian backgrounds, MS’s performance effectively dropped to zero for chromatic L-M 
shifts (1998: 142). Now, MS was pre-adapted to the simple, spatially uniform, reference and 
                                                     
24 Kuriki and Uchikawa (1996). 
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test backgrounds for the same period in both the simple and complex stimulus conditions 
(1998: 138). As such, cone responses to the reference and test patches should have been 
rescaled to approximately the same extent in each condition (Hurlbert & Wolf, 2004: 157; 
Kentridge et al., 2004: 828). MS’s struggles with complex stimuli therefore imply that some 
other factor, in addition to adaptation, contributed to his discrimination of simple stimuli.25 
It is therefore likely that MS retains some cortical mechanisms of constancy, in 
addition to retinal mechanisms. These putative cortical mechanisms are likely involved in 
computing cone(-opponent) contrasts. Areas V1 and V2 are preserved in MS’s left 
hemisphere, as evidenced by the conscious vision in his right visual hemi-field. V1 is 
destroyed in the right hemisphere, accounting for his blind left visual hemi-field. The damage 
to lingual and fusiform gyri, which characterises cerebral achromatopsia, is bilateral. MS 
therefore retains the machinery of double-opponent cells in V1, for example, which are 
widely taken to be involved in coding chromatic contrast across spatial boundaries 
(Gegenfurtner & Kiper, 2003; Hurlbert, 2003; Kentridge et al., 2004: 821, 829). Given the 
aforementioned connection between contrast and constancy, Hurlbert and Wolf (2004: 147) 
argue that ‘V1 and lower areas may therefore play a larger role in colour constancy than 
previously thought.’ Conway & Livingstone (2006: 10842) suggest similarly that double-
opponent cells in macaque primary visual cortex provide ‘ideal substrates for colour 
constancy and colour contrast…, computations that likely involve V1.’ Using fMRI, Barbur 
and Spang (2008) found that rapid or ‘instantaneous’ colour constancy in normal subjects 
produced strong activation in areas V1, V2, and V3, in addition to the fusiform colour area 
                                                     
25 Kentridge et al. (2004: 828) also report that MS could discriminate invariant from variant 
local cone contrasts ‘in free viewing with a series of relatively rapidly changing displays,’ 
which ‘clearly depends upon processes beyond simple adaptation.’ 
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V4. Importantly, using the same paradigm, Barbur and colleagues (2004) found evidence for 
reasonable degrees of instantaneous constancy in three achromatopsic patients, whose lesions 
at least partially covered V4. They conclude that ‘the evidence… points to V1, … as the 
principal neural substrate for mediation of instantaneous colour constancy,’ (2004: 27). 
Let me summarise the argument so far. My philosophical framework ties some types 
of colour constancy to the illumination-invariance of cone contrast coding. Deploying this 
framework, I argued that MS displays a key hallmark of colour constancy, by virtue of 
discriminating between simple stimuli that maintained or violated cone contrast ratios, which 
amounts to discriminating distal changes either in illumination conditions, or surface colour. I 
further argued that MS retains some mechanisms of colour constancy, including cortical 
mechanisms implicated in the computation of cone(-opponent) ratios. In my view, these 
points provide cogent grounds to believe that MS possesses a kind of colour constancy. I 
close this section by highlighting some wider implications of this view. 
One distinctive feature of my view is that it pinpoints the close connection between 
colour constancy and contrast. As noted above, philosophers have tended to regard these 
phenomena quite differently. One notable exception, however, is Akins and Hahn’s (2014) 
timely paper, which argues that the colour vision system is best understood as comprising 
different contrast systems, working in concert to facilitate object seeing. Akins and Hahn 
target the traditional conception that colour vision is primarily for seeing colours; that is, for 
perceiving the sensuous colour qualities of objects. Relating this to my work, the traditional 
conception clearly undergirds the conception of colour constancy provided by Constancy for 
Colours. On this conception, colour constancy with respect to X (for S, at t) is defined as 
constancy in respect of the colour property that S’s visual experience at t presents X as 
having. That is, satisfying Constancy for Colours amounts to having constancy for seen 
colours. As Akins and Hahn point out, however, the traditional conception of colour 
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perception does not mesh well with the contrast-driven nature of chromatic processing. They 
ask, what is contrast processing really good for? The answer, they contend, is that contrast 
processing is very good at helping us see things. In particular, it is very good for marking out 
and emphasising changes in the perceptual signal that are likely to correspond with the 
borders of objects, and distinguishing these from changes that correspond with mere 
fluctuations in illumination. 
Now, although Akins and Hahn do not discuss constancy explicitly, the connections 
between their view and mine should now be coming into view. Firstly, while Akins and Hahn 
emphasise the importance of contrast processing for colour vision quite broadly, my 
framework brings out its fundamental importance for colour constancy. Secondly, we both 
want to move the philosophical discussion away from traditional, intuitive conceptions of 
colour perception (constancy), which focus on our conscious awareness of sensuous colour 
properties, or ‘seeing colours’.26 Thirdly, and finally, Akins and Hahn suggest that colour 
vision is primarily for seeing things; that is, for perceptually differentiating or singling out 
ordinary objects. As we shall see imminently, my account leads us in a similar direction. 
Specifically, I shall argue that the putative contrast-based constancy exhibited by MS 
involves an invariance in the visual perception of the chromatic edges of objects, across 
changes in variations in illumination. As such, building on Akin and Hahn’s stimulating 
work, my view extends and precisifies the sense in which colour perception enables us to see 
things.  
                                                     
26 See also Davies (2018). 
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4. The Chromatic Edge Hypothesis 
Thus far, I have argued that an achromatopsic patient possesses a genuine type of colour 
constancy, despite the profound impairment of their conscious experience of colour. This 
account, however, contains a significant lacuna: absenting any awareness of colour, what is 
the conscious upshot of this putative constancy capacity? This is the most puzzling aspect of 
the paradox of colour constancy. I now present the chromatic edge hypothesis, which holds 
that the constancy in question involves the conscious perceptual representation of chromatic 
contrast properties ‘at’, in a sense to be explained, the edges of surfaces. 
 To begin, recall from section 1 that achromatopsics have three fully functional retinal 
cone mechanisms, and retain cone-opponent processes. Although they are colour blind by 
normal standards, achromatopsics are able to recruit this preserved colour pathway in some 
surprising ways. To pick one example, MS could detect a coloured square concealed in a grey 
checkerboard, so long as the colour was maximally saturated and the background luminance 
contrasts were small (Heywood et al, 1994: 252). As I have already noted, these abilities 
seemingly involve conscious perception: achromatopsia is not blindsight for colour. 
Heywood and colleagues (1998: 413) report that ‘in no case, is a patient required to “guess” 
the identity of an invisible figure concealed in’ such displays. Rather, ‘residual processing, of 
whatever origin, resulted in a conscious perceptual change, notwithstanding the absence of 
colour qualia,’ (1998: 415). 
 How is this possible? The most plausible interpretation is that achromatopsia involves 
a dissociation between two perceptual functions normally fulfilled by chromatic processing in 
the visual system: so-called ‘colour for colouring’ and ‘colour for form.’ Healthy subjects 
have almost identical chromatic contrast thresholds for detecting a difference in colour 
between two abutting surfaces, and detecting the presence of a contour or edge between them. 
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That is, the magnitude of chromatic contrast required for the subject to see a difference in 
colour between two regions is the same as that required to see an edge between them. For this 
reason, it is hard for us to conceive of a visual experience of contour that was not 
accompanied by an appreciable difference in colour. Indeed, it is generally considered 
necessary apriori that our visual experience of differences in colour determines our visual 
experience of such demarcations of form. This idea goes back at least to Aristotle (1991: 3), 
The faculty of seeing, thanks to the fact that all bodies are coloured, brings tidings of 
multitudes of distinctive qualities of all sorts; whence it is through this sense 
especially that we perceive the common sensibles, viz. figure, magnitude, motion, 
number… 
As Sorabji (1971: 61-2, fn.27) explains, 
If there is a sharp boundary between an area of one colour (hue, saturation, or 
brilliance) and an area of another, and if we see where the boundary runs, this is to see 
(part of) the shape of the areas. 
Achromatopsics, however, display marked differences in these contrast thresholds.27 As one 
would expect, their thresholds for detecting colour differences are significantly raised. Also 
in line with predictions, patients show higher thresholds for detecting chromatic contour. 
Surprisingly, however, colour thresholds are raised significantly more than contour 
thresholds. In other words, although achromatopsics are worse than healthy subjects at 
detecting chromatic contours, they are much better than one would predict, given the extent 
of their impairment in detecting differences in colour. Achromatopsics seem capable of using 
                                                     
27 See Barbur et al. (1994), Mollon et al. (1980) and Heywood et al. (1991). 
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information from colour contrasts to perceive form, despite being unable to use it to perceive 
different colours. 
 Detailing this view, Barbur and colleagues (1994: 332) suggest that 
chromatic signals can have at least two distinct functions, and… these functions can 
be affected differentially by the lesion [in achromatopsia]. [These] signals carry 
sufficient information to enable the generation and spatial representation of an object 
in terms of its form and structure, and they can be used to generate at least one more 
visual attribute, namely the perceived object colour. 
Kentridge and colleagues (2004: 822) concur: 
the distinction between wavelength processing for the assignment of surface colour 
and for segmenting chromatic boundaries is not apparent in the normal observer... 
However, these wavelength-based processes are neatly dissociated in cases of cerebral 
achromatopsia. 
Similarly, Chirimuuta and Kingdom (2015: 226): 
it seems reasonable to conclude that these cerebral achromatopsics have a selective 
loss in the ability to use colour vision to see colours (experience hues), but not a loss 
in the ability to use colour vision to see form. 
Clearly, the colour for form interpretation is quite widely endorsed. 
 The interpretation provides the best explanation of the surprising colour-related 
abilities of achromatopsic patients. One early finding was that some patients could detect 
figures in Ishihara colour plates at a distance of two metres, though not at normal reading 
distance. As Mollon and colleagues (1980: 133) observed, at two metres ‘the luminance 
contours of individual discs are no longer resolved and the dominant contour is the hue 
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boundary between figure and ground.’ It seems that the achromatopsics consciously perceive 
this chromatic contour – they can name the figure and trace its outline – despite the discs 
appearing random shades of grey. In another study, MS was able to discriminate sequences of 
isoluminant squares ordered in respect of colour, from sequences of randomly ordered 
squares. Heywood and colleagues (1991: 802) note that his ‘verbal replies showed that he did 
so by detecting an edge between two stimuli that were, to him, perceptually identical.’ 
Heywood and colleagues (1994: 252) found that MS could also detect a highly saturated 
coloured square in a grey checkerboard of varying luminance, seemingly because ‘saturated 
chromatic and achromatic boundaries are conspicuously different to M.S., particularly in 
dynamic displays, when they are of similar luminance contrast.’  
Importantly, MS is not just able to detect the presence of chromatic edges: he can 
discriminate differences in type of chromatic edge as well; types that are individuated by 
differences in the magnitude and direction of chromatic contrast that occurs at the boundary. 
For example, MS could reliably discriminate the odd one out in displays such as Figure 5(b) 
and 5(d). These images show three coloured discs against an equiluminant background, 
where the odd one out is defined either by a different magnitude of cone-contrast from the 
background, as in (b), or an equal-magnitude contrast in a different direction in colour space, 
as in (d). Again, it seems that MS does so by attending to differences in the visual appearance 
of the edges of the discs, which otherwise appear to him to be identical.28 
                                                     
28 Kentridge et al. (2004: 828) suggest that this is explained by the activity of double-
opponent cells, which are ‘good candidates for the mediation of the perception of form from 
colour.’ Tellingly, they add that these cells are ‘a likely contender for an early stage in the 
maintenance of colour constancy,’ and ‘are well-suited to segmenting the visual scene on the 




Figure 5 (Reprinted with permission from Kentridge et al. 2004) 
 The chromatic edge model aims to explain the nature of such unusual visual 
experiences. I assume that when we visually perceive an object, we represent its surfaces and 
their edges. I further assume that such representations have an iconic format. Now, in 
ordinary cases of object seeing, where an object is seen as a figure against its background, the 
edge boundaries of its surfaces appear to be owned by the figure, rather than the ground. In 
the topological jargon, figures appear ‘closed,’ while grounds appear ‘open,’ in the region of 
their boundary with the figure. This view was clearly articulated by the Gestalt psychologists. 
Koffka (1936: 181), for example, reports that in perceiving a figural object, he perceived a 
‘contour line’ which ‘belonged to the enclosed figure and segregated it from the surrounding 
field.’ Elsewhere, Goldman’s (1977: 280) important ‘differentiation condition’ on object 
seeing requires the ‘representation of an edge or boundary.’29 Casati and Varzi (1999: 71) 
claim similarly that boundaries are ‘bona fide spatial entities’ that ‘enter the content of our 
perceptions.’ 
Now, iconic representations are holistic, in that they lack canonical decompositions 
into syntactic constituents that separately denote individuals and features. Take a picture of 
Boris Johnson. There are no constituent parts of this image that separately represent parts of 
Boris Johnson and the features of those parts, such as their shape, size, and texture. Rather, 
                                                     
29 Cf. Burge (2014: 492, fn.7). 
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any constituent part of the image will jointly represent a part of Boris, together with the 
features of that part. Let’s assume that this image has two types of primitive: there are surface 
region primitives, which represent parts of the surface of Boris, and edge primitives, which 
represent segments of the edges of Boris’s surfaces. Surface region primitives holistically 
encode size, shape, texture, and monadic colour information. Edge primitives, in contrast, 
holistically encode curvature, length, orientation, and – crucially, for my view – chromatic 
contrast information. We can think of these edge-based chromatic contrast contents as 
directed magnitudes in colour space: vectors from one location (though no particular 
location) in colour space to another. The vector might tell us, for example, that an edge marks 
a contrast of +N units along the red-green axis, or -M units along the yellow-blue axis. This 
leaves open the spatial orientation or ‘polarity’ of the contrast.30 In Figure 5(d), for example, 
the boundary between the top red disc and the yellow background marks a strong +red 
contrast in the direction of the disc. To accommodate this, recall that on the Gestalt view of 
figure-ground, edges are represented as belonging to just one of the surfaces that they bound. 
In this example, the circular boundary is represented as belonging to the disc, which appears 
‘closed,’ rather than its background, which appears ‘open’. This edge-ownership feature 
determines the spatial polarity of the +red contrast: the edge representation ‘says’ that things 
get redder by a certain magnitude, in the direction of the surface that owns the boundary. 
My view is that this chromatic edge content partly determines the phenomenal 
character of our visual experience of surface boundaries. Edges look to us in certain ways in 
visual experience, and these appearances vary according to the chromatic composition of the 
scene, among other things. These differences in appearance supervene on differences in 
                                                     
30 On the neural representation of chromatic contrast polarity and border ownership, see 
Friedman et al. (2003). See also Davies (2020: §3.3). 
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chromatic edge content, that is, in the spatially oriented, directed magnitude of colour 
contrast represented at that location. This predicts that our experience of an edge between a 
red and yellow region will have a different character to our experience of an edge between a 
red and green region, or a red and blue region, assuming that we control for luminance 
contrast. It is an open question whether chromatic edge appearance can be modelled in 
something like the ordinary opponent-colour space, but I assume not. More likely, the quality 
space for edges will be of lower dimensionality, sui generis, and will depend in complex, 
context-dependent ways on both luminance and chromatic contrast.31 
The chromatic edge model is independently motivated by a range of evidence 
(Davies, 2021). The present aim is to apply the model to theorise the unusual constancy 
capacity in achromatopsia. The standard interpretation of achromatopsia as involving 
preserved colour-for-form function provides a presumptive reason to favour my account. In 
what follows, I argue more directly in its favour. To begin, recall that changes in illumination 
almost flawlessly preserve spatial (and temporal) cone (and cone-opponent) contrasts. The 
flipside is that changes in surface colour routinely change these contrasts. As noted above, it 
is plausible that our almost unerring capacity to discriminate illumination changes from 
surface colour changes is a corollary of this pattern. Now, the illumination-invariance of 
cone(-opponent) contrasts likely serves a dual purpose in early vision. Via the colour for 
colouring function, these invariant contrasts provide a partial basis for computing 
(approximately) invariant representations of surface colour, in line with the cone contrast 
                                                     
31 As Akins (2014: 200-201) notes, luminance edges and chromatic edges are largely 
statistically independent in visual images. As such, having a distinct capacity to represent 




rule. In addition, these contrasts plausibly input into edge computations, via the colour for 
form function. Suppose that a red disc viewed against a yellow background under direct 
sunlight at t1 produces a +red opponent contrast of N. If the light changes to skylight at t2, 
the contrast between disc and background will remain at roughly N +red. By hypothesis, 
these contrasts drive the formation of representations of the disc’s boundary with its 
background. The invariance in the chromatic contrasts registered at t1 and t2 determine, 
along with registrations of the boundary’s orientation and length, that these representations 
categorise the edge as being of an invariant spatial and chromatic type. In particular, the edge 
content will attribute a constant chromatic contrast of N +red across this temporal interval. 
This invariance in chromatic edge content, I suggest, determines a constancy in the visual 
appearance of the boundary across the change in illumination. The edge of the disc, hence the 
very form of the disc, has an invariant appearance under changes in illumination. It 
consistently looks the way that the boundary of a red object against a yellow background 
looks, which I contend is different, for example, from the way the boundary of a blue object 
against a yellow background looks.  
 To be clear on the implications here, the claim is that the colour for form function, 
just as much as colour for colouring, has associated perceptual constancies. Recalling Akins 
and Hahn (2014), the former constancies are associated with our capacity to see things, while 
the latter, more familiar constancies are associated with our capacity to see colours. The 
former constancies involve an invariance with respect to the chromatic contrast properties 
that are attributed in perceptual representations of surface boundaries. This representational 
invariant constitutes a primitive type of colour constancy, a basic objectifying capacity within 
the colour vision system. 
Although this capacity undoubtedly falls outside our ordinary conception of colour 
perception, it is nonetheless intuitive that we have it. The familiar fact is that when we look at 
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an object under changing light, we find that its absolute colour tends to appear fairly constant. 
Intuitively, however, we also find that our awareness of the form of the surface – the sense in 
which the surface appears as demarcated or differentiated from its background – exhibits its 
own, distinctive sort of constancy. The aspect of experience that I am drawing attention to is 
not our awareness of the surface’s shape per se; of its circularity, say. Rather, it is our 
awareness of the limits of the surface, its outermost bounds; the elusive, widthless parts that 
determine its shape properties, as opposed to constituting them. It seems intuitive, for 
example, that a change in lighting typically would not result in a surface appearing much 
more (or less) pronounced, in terms of how strongly (or weakly) our visual experience 
differentiates or segments the surface from its background. Indeed, it seems the Gestalt 
psychologists knew this (West et al., 1996), but as often happens, things that should not have 
been forgotten were lost.  
 We can speculate on why such chromatic edge constancies should exist. It has been 
suggested that colour perception might have evolved to facilitate the detection and 
segregation of coloured fruits against dappled foliage (Mollon, 1989). The opponent axes that 
characterise human colour processing are well suited to emphasising strong red-green 
contrasts, as with a red berry in a leafy bush, which are conveniently orthogonal to contrasts 
along the yellow-blue axis, about which most natural changes in light occur. Now, one way to 
achieve good segregation would be to implement a colour for colouring function that 
produces representations of absolute surface colour properties, which stand in the relevant 
contrast relations. Constancies associated with this function would ensure that the strong 
contrast between the absolute redness of the berry, and the absolute greenness of the leaves, 
is not diminished by changes in illumination. This would be one way – and a very good way 
– to ensure that the berry segregates well from surrounding foliage, even in dappled 
conditions. But it need not be the only way, nor even the most basic way to achieve this aim. 
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 Here is an alternative formula: first, use strong chromatic contrasts to generate 
representations of surface edges; second, produce different types of edge representation, 
depending on the particular direction and magnitude of chromatic contrast; third, ensure that 
these edge representations exhibit high levels of invariance under changes in illumination. By 
this formula, the strong opponent red-green contrast between the berry and leaves would 
produce an edge representation of a different type to those produced by the weaker, non-
opponent yellow-green contrasts between different leaves. The edge of the berry would 
therefore appear different to all the other edges in the vicinity, despite the many criss-
crossing luminance variations caused by the dappled illumination. Intuitively, the berry 
would segment more strongly, its form appearing more pronounced, relative to its 
background, than any of the leaves, relative to their surrounds. Crucially, moreover, the berry 
would appear no less pronounced were a cloud to pass overhead, the dominant illumination 
changing from sunlight to skylight, given the illumination-invariance of the contrasts that 
drive the edge representations. Such a capacity might well facilitate the detection and 
segregation of coloured fruits in dappled conditions. Indeed, I can imagine creatures unable 
to perceive the absolute colours of surfaces, but nonetheless able to forage successfully using 
only their awareness of such boundary-based contrasts, alongside capacities for size, shape, 
and distance perception.32 These contrasts would bring red berries to the fore in their visual 
                                                     
32 Compare Mollon’s (1989: 21-26) discussion of the difficulties in foraging encountered by 
subjects with acquired achromatopsia. Although these subjects can no longer distinguish 
berries ‘by the Colour from the neighbouring Grass,’ they can distinguish them ‘by the shape’ 
at close distances (1989: 23). We can speculate, however, as to whether such detection is at 
all facilitated by the representation of strong chromatic contrasts at the boundaries of the 
berries, as proposed here, or whether it is purely a matter of shape-based detection. 
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experience of the scene, despite their experience lacking any sensuous chromatic 
phenomenology. For such creatures, chromatic edge constancy would ensure that the berry 
segregates consistently across all phases of daylight, and other, more transient changes in 
illumination. 
 Moving on, an important advantage of the chromatic edge hypothesis is that it would 
explain the drop-off in MS’s performance between simple and complex stimulus conditions, 
where retinal adaptation could not. Recall that MS could discriminate cone contrasts for 
patches against uniformly coloured backgrounds. In these conditions, there were uniform 
chromatic contrasts along the entire boundary of each patch. In the complex condition, 
patches were embedded in Mondrian backgrounds composed of rectangles of different 
colours. Each patch therefore abutted several differently coloured rectangles in its 
background, producing non-uniform chromatic contrasts along its boundary. Now, the 
chromatic edge model predicts that in the simple condition, the uniform chromatic contrast 
between a test patch and its background should result in its edges having a uniform visual 
appearance. In the complex condition, the varying chromatic contrasts along the perimeter of 
the test patch would produce variations in the visual appearance of this boundary. This 
predicts that it would be easier to discriminate between ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ matching 
alternatives in the simple condition, than in the complex condition. On the chromatic edge 
model, a ‘correct’ match would have edges with the same overall visual appearance as the 
edges of the test patch. An ‘incorrect’ match would have edges that appeared overall different 
to the edges of the test patch. Presumably, it would be easier to assess these options between 
patches with uniform contrasts, hence uniform appearance along their entire boundaries. In 
the simple condition, if the edge of the test patch looks uniformly F, and the edge of the 
matching alternative looks uniformly G, then the subject may easily infer that they are 
different. In contrast, in the complex condition, if the edge of the test patch looks in part F, in 
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part G, and in part H, and the edge of the matching alternative looks in part F’, in part G’, and 
in part H’, then it would take a more complicated comparison to discern whether they are 
different (as indeed they are).33 
In noting this advantage, however, we have uncovered a potentially worrying 
implication of my view. A change in background colour alone will produce a change in the 
chromatic contrast between the patch and its background. As such, if we take a patch (or 
patches) of constant colour and present it successively (or simultaneously) against differently 
coloured backgrounds, my view predicts that the chromatic edge content of our perceptual 
representation of the patch will change accordingly. Chromatic edge content therefore will be 
highly variant under changes/variations in background colour. This implies, however, that 
chromatic edge content cannot help explain so-called background-independent colour 
constancy, however well-suited it seems to explaining illumination-independent colour 
constancy.34 This is potentially problematic, because in normal viewing conditions, we 
perceive objects as fairly constant in colour across both types of change. It seems reasonable 
therefore to expect our ultimate theory of colour constancy to explain both types of case. 
This objection raises an important and neglected question regarding the scope of 
theories of colour constancy. Almost without exception, philosophical discussions of colour 
constancy have focused only on the illumination-independent kind.35 Much the same is true 
of the science. Failures of background-independent colour constancy are frequently 
                                                     
33 I use F, G, … as placeholders for the different looks that edges might have, as a result of 
their different chromatic contrasts. 
34 This distinction originates in Whittle and Challands (1969: 1108). 
35 Allen (2016: Ch2) considers both types, and seems to want to account for both within a 
single theory of colour constancy. 
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discussed, but not under that description: they are usually classified as colour contrast effects, 
as discussed in section 3. That we in fact have robust background-independent constancy is 
typically overlooked. Now, I fully acknowledge the extent of our background-independent 
constancy. All the same, my view only explains one type of illumination-independent 
constancy. The issue is whether this partitioning of illumination- and background-
independent constancy is appropriate. 
My view, building on the pluralism of section 2, is that each type of constancy needs 
independent theoretical treatment. At the end of inquiry, we may expect that certain 
commonalities or overlapping features will emerge. As a research programme, for now, 
however, I believe that we should embrace splitting rather than lumping. The splitting 
approach is supported by considering the computational descriptions of these constancies. As 
I assume will be familiar, on Marr’s influential view, the computational level description of a 
cognitive capacity should specify the ‘why’ of the computation, among other things. At a 
suitably fine-grained level of detail, the ‘why’ of illumination-independent constancy clearly 
differs from the ‘why’ of background-independent constancy. The former enables organisms 
to derive stable representations of colour-related properties of objects, despite occupying 
environments in which the illumination conditions are continuously varying across space and 
time. The latter, in contrast, enables organisms to derive stable representations of colour-
related properties of objects, given that they are (presumably) mobile creatures with varying 
spatial perspectives on the world, and given that many objects of perception are themselves 
mobile, hence liable to be viewed across changes in background conditions. 
Now, a lumper might suggest that these computational descriptions could be 
conjoined, yielding a combined illumination-and-background-independent conception of 
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colour constancy.36 But remember what the computational level description is supposed to do 
within the theory. For one, it is supposed to inform and constrain the search for appropriate 
algorithmic- and implementation-level descriptions of the capacity. On this score, the 
splitting approach has proven very productive. For it seems that the visual system does 
contain information-processing mechanisms specifically geared towards resolving the 
illumination-independent constancy problem, and which are ill-suited to resolving the 
background-independent constancy problem. As Richard Brown (2003: 248) notes, 
There is an interesting complementarity between these two aspects of colour 
constancy, in that simple mechanisms that would tend to maintain excellent colour 
constancy for one of these types of variation, tend to fail quite badly for the other… 
There may not be a general solution that achieves colour constancy with both 
changing illuminants and changing backgrounds. 
In my view, mechanisms that compute cone-excitation ratios are a paradigm example. 
Whereas illumination changes/variations produce robust invariant signals from such 
mechanisms, background changes/variations yield widely varying signals, which thus fail to 
support background-independent constancy. The mechanisms earn their keep by 
implementing (types of) illumination-independent constancy, not background-independent 
constancy. Splitting, rather than lumping, thus provides the best framework for investigating 
such mechanisms. 
Another important objection to the chromatic edge hypothesis is that it is motivated 
by a rare and unusual pathology; indeed, a single subject, whose experience bears little 
                                                     




resemblance to our own. The hypothesis therefore lacks the introspective support and 
evidence base of mainstream theories of colour constancy. In other work (Davies, 2021), I 
have presented additional arguments in support of the hypothesis, appealing to aspects of 
visual phenomenology, physiology, and function in healthy subjects. None of these 
arguments, however, directly addresses the issue of constancy. I now therefore assess 
whether it is plausible that edge perception contributes to constancy in healthy subjects.  
The empirical evidence is rather equivocal on this matter. Cornellisen and Brenner 
(1995) conducted an eye tracking study on subjects performing simultaneous asymmetric 
colour matching tasks. Subjects were given either a paper match or hue-saturation match 
instruction. If invariant edge appearance contributed to constancy, we would predict a 
positive correlation between the time spent looking at edges, and the degree of constancy 
exhibited by subjects’ matches. Although subjects had significantly higher degrees of 
constancy in the paper match condition, however, they spent no more time on average 
looking at edges than in the hue-saturation match condition (1995: 2440-41). Despite the null 
finding, it is worth noting that the stimuli were complex Mondrians, in which the test and 
reference patches abutted numerous differently coloured patches in the background. For the 
reasons discussed above, this might reduce the effectiveness of using the appearance of the 
patch’s border as a cue in setting one’s matches. Another issue highlighted by Foster and 
colleagues (1997: 1343) is that ‘observers may have relied on information derived from edges 
without looking at them.’ It is well established, after all, that subjects can direct attention to 
features or objects that are not fixated. Absenting further data, however, we cannot push this 
further. 
Overall, though, Foster and colleagues (1997) are similarly sceptical regarding the 
contribution of edges to constancy. Reporting a task involving discrimination of illuminant 
changes from surface colour changes (1997: 1343), 
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some control measurements… suggested that edge information has little influence on 
performance… [O]bservers’ ability to discriminate illuminant changes from material 
changes in Mondrian patterns was found… to be only moderately impaired when 
black borders of width 1.5 deg visual angle were introduced between patches so that 
spatial chromatic induction effects were largely eliminated…  
Note briefly that the use of Mondrian stimuli complicates matters somewhat, as described 
above. More importantly, however, Foster and colleagues are not talking about edge 
perception in the way that I am. Their prediction is that the black border should decrease the 
extent to which the absolute colour appearance of the patch is influenced by the surround. 
That is, the border should reduce the effect of ‘chromatic induction’ or colour contrast, which 
as we’ve seen is crucial in maintaining constant colour appearance across changes in 
illumination. Their point, then, is that insofar as introducing borders only moderately 
impaired the ability to discriminate illuminant changes from surface colour changes, this task 
probably does not depend significantly on constancy in the traditional sense of invariant hue 
and saturation appearance. 
There are two important qualifications, however. Firstly, the black borders did at least 
moderately impair performance. Secondly, note that introducing a large, coincident 
luminance contrast at the patch’s boundary would also have the effect of swamping or 
masking any contribution of chromatic contrast to the visual appearance of this boundary. 
That is, the black border might decrease colour contrast, hence hue-saturation invariance; but 
in addition, it might impair chromatic edge representation, thus precluding invariance in edge 
appearance. As such, the data are consistent with the view that either invariant hue-saturation 
or invariant edge appearance contribute at least a small amount to the capacity to discriminate 
illuminant changes from surface colour changes. 
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A study by Barbur and colleagues (2004) found more substantial effects of black 
borders between patches and their surrounds. Their task involved a novel asymmetric 
matching paradigm, in which the test and reference patch were alternated in rapid succession 
at the same spatial location. Subjects performed matching by adjustment, using a hue-
saturation-brightness match criterion. The task was therefore intended to isolate 
‘instantaneous’ mechanisms of colour constancy, in the phenomenal sense of hue-saturation 
invariance. They reported a ‘rapid decrease’ in constancy with an increase in border width 
from 0 to 1 degree, levelling off through 3 degrees (2004: 12). Pursuant to the discussion of 
Foster and colleagues (1997), as this task involved hue-saturation matching, the results are 
consistent with the hypothesis that the border reduces the effect of colour contrast in 
stabilising colour appearance under changes in illumination. Again, however, the results are 
also consistent with the hypothesis that the border undermines the contribution of chromatic 
edge perception. That is, in some small part, successful hue-saturation matches might involve 
adjusting the test patch so that its edges appear the same as those of the reference patch in 
respect of their pronouncedness or distinctness. It must be granted that the first hypothesis 
carries most weight, but absenting direct evidence to the contrary, the second, edge-based 
hypothesis remains a live possibility. 
 In closing, it is worth noting the inherent methodological difficulties in assessing 
chromatic edge perception in healthy subjects. Whatever the theoretical rationale for positing 
perceptual representations of edges, it is clear that we ordinarily pay them little heed. Aside 
from cliffs and cutting objects, edges per se have few practical implications. Barring a few 
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notable exceptions, edges are not objects of aesthetic appreciation.37 Of course, healthy 
subjects see colours, and once one has this sort of experience, it is hard, if not impossible, to 
ignore as a basis for answering colour-related questions. Concerning colour constancy, ‘the 
edges of that bright red object look constant under the changing light,’ said nobody, ever. 
Assessing the chromatic edge hypothesis in healthy subjects therefore poses a considerable 
challenge. That is why the achromatopsic data is, in a sense, a double-edged sword. On the 
one hand, it may reveal an aspect of constancy that is difficult to discern in normal subjects. 
On the other hand, for that very reason, we may continue to wonder about its relevance to our 
own case. 
While I feel the force of this concern, I offer two points in mitigation. Firstly, 
although edges are obscure entities, it seems plausible that perceptually differentiating an 
object from its background typically requires perceiving at least part of its boundary, as noted 
on Goldman’s (1977) differentiation condition. As such, if we follow Akins and Hahn in 
holding that colour vision helps us to see things, then we should find it quite palatable that 
colour vision helps us discern the edges of objects. By the same token, if the idea that colour 
vision facilitates object seeing seems relevant to our own case, then the notion that colour 
vision facilitates the representation of edges should seem very relevant to our own case. 
Secondly, and in closing, recall that my aim has been to theorise the basic constituents of our 
mature colour constancy capacity. Given the nature of this project, it is unsurprising that the 
investigation has yielded a perceptual kind that seems quite unfamiliar, and of uncertain 
provenance. After all, if it was introspectively obvious that we have chromatic edge 
                                                     
37 Commenting on Josef Albers’s Aurora, Murawski (2016) comments that the ‘strong 
contrasts between hues—as well as alternating squares of light reflection and light 
absorption—draw our attention to the edges as “hot points” of activity.’ 
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perception, the traditional approach to the philosophy of colour would have singled it out 
long ago. Having long since left the comfort of the armchair, one can only hope that we now 
have a clearer view of the lower borders of colour perception.38 
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